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ABSTRACT 
The moral importance of the ‘intention–foresight’ distinction has long been a matter of philosophical 
controversy, particularly in the context of end-of-life care. Previous empirical research in Australia 
has suggested that general physicians and surgeons may use analgesic or sedative infusions with 
ambiguous intentions, their actions sometimes approximating ‘slow euthanasia’. In this paper, we 
report findings from a qualitative study of 18 Australian palliative care medical specialists, using in-
depth interviews to address the use of sedation at the end of life. The majority of subjects were 
agnostic or atheistic. In contrast to their colleagues in acute medical practice, these Australian 
palliative care specialists were almost unanimously committed to distinguishing their actions from 
euthanasia. This commitment appeared to arise principally from the need to maintain a clear 
professional role, and not obviously from an ideological opposition to euthanasia. While some 
respondents acknowledged that there are difficult cases that require considered reflection upon 
one's intention, and where there may be some ‘mental gymnastics,’ the nearly unanimous view was 
that it is important, even in these difficult cases, to cultivate an intention that focuses exclusively on 
the relief of symptoms. We present four narratives of ‘terminal’ sedation – cases where sedation 
was administered in significant doses just before death, and may well have hastened death. 
Considerable ambiguities of intention were evident in some instances, but the discussion around 
these clearly exceptional cases illustrates the importance of intention to palliative care specialists in 
maintaining their professional roles. 
 
Keywords:     intention; hypnotics and sedatives; euthanasia; terminal care; double effect; 
qualitative research; end-of-life 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Arguments about the morality of various forms of end-of-life care often focus on the moral 
significance of the distinction between intention and foresight. In particular, there is debate about 
whether there is an important moral difference between, on the one hand, giving sedative or 
analgesic drugs to relieve symptoms, foreseeing that death may be hastened; and on the other 
hand, using the same drugs with the intention of hastening death.1 While this debate has largely 
turned on normative moral theories, it has been increasingly informed by the results of empirical 
research. Quantitative studies of doctors without specific palliative care training have suggested that 
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analgesics and/or sedatives are sometimes used with an intention or ‘partial intention’ to hasten 
death,2 thus approximating ‘slow euthanasia’.3 In our own qualitative study of Australian general 
physicians, doctors demonstrated considerable ambiguity about their intentions and failed to 
distinguish consistently between intention and foresight.4 
 
A largely unchallenged consensus has emerged from the palliative care literature that most patients 
can be kept comfortable with carefully titrated doses of drugs that have little effect on the timing of 
death.5 Thus, in most cases, doctors in palliative care do not foresee that death is a likely 
consequence of their actions. Nonetheless, even within palliative care, it is widely acknowledged 
that some patients will require quite ‘heavy’ sedation to control their pain, anxiety or distress.6 In at 
least some of these cases, a hastened death is foreseeable, and the intention-foresight distinction 
must be invoked if palliative care is to be distinguished from euthanasia or assisted suicide.7 
 
There appears to be a range of views about ‘appropriate’ use of sedatives, different practices being 
viewed as more or less likely to foreseeably hasten death, and more or less morally contentious, 
depending on a variety of factors such as when sedation is given, why it is given, who is involved in 
the decision-making, how frequently doses are escalated or reviewed, and whether hydration is 
provided concurrently.8 Explicit patient preferences on any of these points would naturally go a long 
way to providing justification.9 There is however particular contention about sedation where the 
aim is to achieve and maintain unconsciousness until death, even where this has been chosen by the 
patient.10 This practice is sometimes referred to as ‘terminal sedation’ although, without 
qualification, that term itself is highly ambiguous.11 
 
What is lacking in the literature to date is a qualitative account of palliative care doctors’ experience 
with sedation at the end of life, exploring the intention-foresight distinction in that context. We 
undertook a study to address this issue. 
 
METHODS 
Ethics clearance was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committees of the two participating 
universities. Recruitment was initiated by a presentation at a symposium on palliative care in 2006, 
and followed up with invitations sent via newsletters and bulletins of the ANZ Society of Palliative 
Medicine and by ‘snowball sampling’.12 Potential participants were invited to be interviewed for 
approximately one hour on end-of-life decision-making, particularly regarding the use of sedation. 
Two nurses and 18 doctors were interviewed. Given that ultimately we had only a small number of 
nurses, and given the fact that nurses might be seen to represent a different population due to their 
more limited authority, we have excluded them from the analysis (although the two nurses 
interviewed did not present any substantially different themes, or contradict the themes presented 
here). Some volunteers from some metropolitan centres were not interviewed, to ensure that those 
cities were not over-represented. Selective recruitment for religiosity was initially planned, but 
proved unnecessary as the sample was reasonably well balanced in this respect. 
 
Analysis was conducted after the first 3 interviews and then again after 6 interviews, and the 
interview schedule was adjusted in an iterative fashion, the better to address the relevant issues as 
they emerged. Recruitment was considered complete when it appeared that there was saturation 
with regard to the principle themes of interest (relating to intention and foresight).13 
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Interviews were semi-structured. Religious background and beliefs were discussed (given the 
recognized association of religious tradition with views about euthanasia and assisted suicide).14 
Respondents were then prompted to discuss the distinctions and/or overlap between palliative care 
and euthanasia/assisted suicide. If the topics were not initiated by the respondent, the interviewer 
directed discussion to the use of sedation and particularly the use of continuous heavy sedation. 
Views about the morality and possible legalization of euthanasia were not explicitly sought but, 
given the nature of the discussion, most respondents gave some indication about their views on 
these issues. 
 
Interviews were conducted and recorded by CDD, transcribed by a professional typist and checked 
for accuracy by CDD. Interview transcripts were read and discussed by all three authors. Theory was 
not developed in this study in the traditional sense of grounded theory.15 Instead, we were 
ultimately looking for confirmation of, contradiction of, or variation on themes that have previously 
been identified, some of which had emerged in our previous empirical studies, and many of which 
have been discussed extensively in the moral philosophy and palliative care literature, relating to 
categories such as ‘intention’, ‘foresight’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’, ‘psychological distress’, ‘professional role’, 
‘unease/discomfort (of the doctor)’ and so on. In particular we looked for passages of text that 
indicated clarity, implied ambiguity or explicit (acknowledged) ambiguity or uncertainty of intention 
or foresight; and passages of text that indicated ‘comfort’ or ‘discomfort’ of the doctor with a 
particular action, type of action or scenario. Following general discussions, codes were developed by 
CDD, with the help of Nvivo7 software,16 to identify these passages of interest. The coding 
categories were reviewed independently and approved by the two other authors. Following coding 
by CDD, the coded transcripts were discussed again within the authorial group, appropriateness of 
coding was confirmed, and codes were gradually collapsed into dominant themes, particularly those 
relating to intention and foresight. Triangulation17 with our previous empirical data was undertaken 
to ensure consistency. As a central theme was a belief by respondents that the intention-foresight 
distinction is a substantially important one, we looked for ‘negative’ or ‘deviant’ cases (in which data 
seem to contradict the emerging theme);18 and found only one (reported below as Respondent 13). 
 
We present four narratives largely unedited, followed by an analysis of the main themes articulated 
in them, with supplementary quotes from other interviews. Plain text in parentheses indicates 
editorial clarification of meaning, but these additions have been minimized as far as possible. These 
four were not the only narratives of ‘terminal sedation’ or requests for terminal sedation provided, 
but they were the longest and most clearly described examples, many other anecdotes being brief or 
fragmented. The four narratives chosen best illustrate the complexities of intention, without risk of 
editorial compromise. They also illustrate multiple themes. 
 
Gender and a description of religiosity are provided for the respondents quoted. Further individual 
demographics are omitted because of the potential for identification in a relatively small 
professional community. 
 
RESULTS 
Participants 
Demographics 
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There were 18 participants, 16 interviewed individually and the last two interviewed together by 
request. Six respondents were from regional centres and 12 from metropolitan centres throughout 
Australia. Ages ranged from 29 to 67, and there were 11 males and 7 females. Three participants did 
not have a formal specialist qualification in palliative medicine, but practised mostly or exclusively 
within that field (one general practitioner, one ‘registrar’ or specialist physician-in-training, and one 
‘Career Medical Officer’). The remaining 15 doctors were specialist palliative care physicians. 
Religiosity/spirituality of participants 
Almost all respondents indicated an interest in ‘spirituality’. Six respondents identified themselves as 
having a Christian faith, and/or an ongoing association with organized Christianity. The remaining 12 
respondents came from largely Judeo-Christian backgrounds and had a variety of roughly spiritual 
interests; however their views regarding the existence of God or an experience after death could 
best be described as atheistic or agnostic. 
Views of participants on euthanasia or assisted suicide as a societal issue 
Six respondents stated explicitly, or implied in different ways, that they were not fundamentally 
opposed to euthanasia or assisted suicide, including comments to the effect that they could 
conceive of doing it in extreme circumstances, could conceive of wanting it for themselves, felt 
comfortable with people choosing it, or felt comfortable with the possibility of it being legalized 
(including one respondent who felt that the law should be reformed). All of these respondents held 
agnostic or atheistic viewpoints. Of the remaining participants, 10 respondents volunteered 
expressions of some level of opposition to euthanasia and assisted suicide, and 2 did not give clear 
indications of their position on the issue. 
‘Terminal sedation’ 
In the four narratives that follow, respondents give descriptions of cases that we have described as 
‘terminal sedation’. As noted in the introduction, ‘terminal sedation’ has no universally agreed 
meaning. We use the term here to indicate the close temporal association between death and the 
administration of sedative drugs, and the possibility that the drugs used actually hastened death to 
some degree in all four cases. It should be stressed that the respondents themselves flagged these 
as exceptional cases. Most respondents indicated that sedative use was generally carefully titrated 
against symptoms, was only rarely aimed at inducing complete unconsciousness, and infrequently or 
rarely influenced the timing of death. We have chosen these four narratives because they best 
illustrate the complexities of intention, which is the main focus of this paper, but a number of other 
respondents volunteered similar (albeit shorter and more fragmented) descriptions of terminal 
sedation. There was considerable variation amongst respondents in their practices, and several 
respondents indicated that they would be uncomfortable or unwilling to provide sedation in 
circumstances similar to those described in one or more of these four narratives. On the other hand, 
this variation cut across religious and ideological lines. The four narratives below are given by 
respondents with very different demographics; and there was nothing about the experience or 
background of these four respondents that distinguished them as a group from other participants. 
 
    Narrative 1 
one of the most challenging and, I think, instructive situations I've ever been in, was a 
man[with a terminal illness]who . . . ended up on a BIPAP19machine . . . had a lot of 
interaction with his family and decided that he would take the ventilator off when he got to 
the point that he was 24 hours dependent, and he felt it was time and he wanted someone 
to be there to relieve any distressing symptoms that might arise. And the GP refused to have 
anything to do with it. . . . So I and a palliative care nurse went there . . . he took his 
ventilator off, I put in an IV, gave him a bit of sedation beforehand, but not, you know, to the 
5 |  P a g e
 
point where he was . . . asleep, he was just a little bit woozy, took the ventilator off, and 
over the next 3 or so hours, poured in what I would've thought was enough midazolam, 
phenobarb and opioid20to kill a horse. And, I kept him sedated and at any point where he 
looked in any way distressed, I would give him another small bolus. And he eventually died, 
and quite peacefully . . . and I use this as a teaching discussion with students, and I ask them 
whether what I did was palliative care or euthanasia, and more students than not will say . . . 
that was euthanasia. And, the outcome . . . were I to give him what I gave him over hours in 
one bolus would have been precisely the same; he would have died peacefully, and much 
more quickly, and certainly much less stressfully for me! I know that's a long story . . . but it's 
been a pivot point for me, and I've often gone back to it, and inspected it . . . and I still feel 
that I did absolutely the right thing. I feel entirely comfortable about that. The family has 
always felt the same way . . .  
 
    But the challenge is . . . well, if you're going to do that, what is the difference, really? What 
is the difference between doing that or giving a bolus . . . and what would I want? And I think 
I would want the bolus . . . if I got to that point . . . I mean this man, he was dying, he was 
going to die very soon, and he was pretty well helpless, but he could still communicate. And 
that's probably the point where I would pull the pin as well. 
 
    CDD: You said that you put it to the students whether that's euthanasia, or palliative care, 
and I'm interested to know what you think. 
 
    I don't think it was euthanasia. 
 
    CDD: Yep . . . [so] there is the bolus that you could've given, and which you think you 
might want yourself, and that would be euthanasia. So . . . between the euthanasia and the 
palliative care, there are three hours, but there's, is there anything else? Because, as we 
both know, there's also . . .  
 
    Well, I mean, there's this question of intent. . . . and you know I wonder whether that is 
just a salve . . . but . . . so what? Even if it is a somewhat superficial salve to conscience, it 
does allow us to do what we need to do . . . it allows me to go into a situation like that and 
come away from it feeling that I've done the right thing . . . So . . . however open to 
challenge that little bit of mental gymnastics is, I'm happy to use it as a crutch . . .  
 
    if I can't function comfortably in that, or ‘comfortably’ isn't the right word, but, if I can't 
function in that situation . . . or if others like me can't function in that situation, then we are 
deprived of palliative care at the time we most desperately need it . . . it's a personal salve, 
but it also allows a necessary system of care, a humane system of care, to operate. . . . and if 
it is a flawed or challengeable piece of logic . . . so be it. 
 
    Respondent 12 (male, atheist) 
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    Narrative 2 
 
    I had a patient ten days ago, where we had used large doses of medication to try and ease 
their distress, with infusions running, with quite high doses of benzodiazepines and 
haloperidol, 21 with intermittent phenobarbitone, and the patient was still very distressed, 
and the family were very distressed. And . . . I drew up a syringe of 15 mg of midazolam, and 
I injected it slowly intravenously, until that patient's anguish settled. And, in fact it only took 
7.5 mg, now my intent was to ease this . . . intractable anguish which was there, but part of 
my intent was to ease the family's anguish too, and I own that it may be as to deal with my 
anguish as well, and I can't tell you which of all of those muddles predominated, except that 
this was a, a guy we'd had a lot to do with over a long period of time . . . horrible situation, 
and, you know, he died perhaps half an hour later. Now, I may have induced his death . . . 
but I can't tell you what intent is there . . .  
 
    I hesitate to use that approach, I've rarely done it in my practising life, but sometimes 
when there's an extreme situation, the junior staff have exhausted all they're able to do, the 
nursing staff are beside themselves, and we've used all that we are able to in our usual, 
informed way, then I am prepared, as the senior doctor involved, to take the responsibility 
of that decision, with a lot of reservations and misgivings, and aware that I could perhaps be 
criticized. It will go to the death audit committee . . . I may well have to explain what 
happened, to the death audit committee and while I know that as long as I say ‘My intent 
was to relieve distress’, that no one can criticize me, and that I'm legally exonerated and so 
forth, I still, part of me says, ‘Yeah, but you knew that he was gonna die if you did it’, and so, 
I think . . . we have to wrestle with these as individual cases, and I don't think you make rules 
about it and I don't think you can legislate for it. I think we should really be troubled, every 
time, and we should be . . . accountable for the decision we make, and, and be prepared to 
own it. 
 
    CDD: . . . you say that we should be troubled by it each time . . . it's not completely clear in 
your own mind? . . . what's the intention in those circumstances? 
 
    I: No. I think it is clear in my mind . . . but I think that . . . um, we need to be really sure 
that we've exhausted all possibilities . . . I think we need to wrestle with the difficulties of 
what we should do every time . . . I don't think there should be precedents . . . because it's 
been done once before doesn't mean it's right the next time. 
 
    CDD: When ‘it's’ been done once before? 
 
    Well, when you know that that medication has been given to ease distress, deliberately, to 
overcome terminal anguish, in a patient, and they have subsequently died within the next 
short while. 
 
    CDD: Yep. So the ‘it’, the thing that you feel that we need to be really . . . anguishing about 
. . . is the very close association between . . .  
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    An action and reaction. 
 
    CDD: The action and death? 
 
    Mmm[assents]. 
 
    CDD: And yet . . . the philosophy that surrounds this is that it's not the close association 
that is alleged to matter, it's the intention. 
 
    That's right, that is correct. But, but, sometimes, it's very hard to know[pause]whether . . . 
what the intent is, while the base, the prime intent, is to deal with the agonal state of the 
patient, there is no doubt that it also deals with our distress, and the family distress, and I 
don't think you can separate those things, they are an intimate part of it, so we have to 
make sure that we're not treating ourselves, when we're trying to do this, and we have to 
make sure that we're not treating the family, that we are actually addressing the patient's 
distress. I guess that's what I'm saying. And that's where you have to be very sure. 
 
    Respondent 11 (male, practising Anglican) 
 
    Narrative 3 
    . . . it's certainly happened a couple of times in the last few years, where a patient has, 
despite our best attempts to get control of the pain, or existential suffering, whatever – has 
said, ‘No, I can't take this anymore, I need to be out of here . . . I don't want to be aware of 
this anymore.’ And I think that is unusual, but occasionally it happens and it's very 
confronting – you consult within the staff very quickly, get as much information as you can 
from the relatives, and then, you make them less aware. And I've got no qualms about that, 
I'm not – I'm not bringing – I'm not aiming to bring about their death, and I don't think I do 
bring about their death, the death is obviously imminent . . . but they are actually making a 
decision that they can't cope with that degree of distress and clearly, in the earlier 
situations, you would look at things like depression, and see whether you've got a 
remediable cause of that, but some people have such existential distress at the end of life 
that they do request to be less aware . . . some of them might request to die, but I mean, I 
basically talk about gaining better control and making them less aware of their distress and 
their circumstances for whatever time they have left . . . and then I would use the 
appropriate medication to gain control of that . . . 
 
    I think[it]depends on . . . where that person is in their illness trajectory . . . but the cases 
that I've been involved with . . . patients who are really getting really towards, right towards 
the end of their illness, and they're really, you know, are able, usually in a faint and weak 
voice, but able to say, well, you know, ‘I just need to be’, you know, ‘I need to be more 
comfortable, I need to be out of this.’ And I've said, ‘Okay, well, we'll do what we need to do’ 
. . .  
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    I'm not, as a palliative care physician, here to determine the timing of your death, I'm here 
to try to determine the quality of your death . . . and nor do I believe[pause]and feel 
comfortable being the human agent of death – so, I don't feel comfortable, at this stage, 
with performing ‘euthanasia’ as such, in inverted commas. I feel that I can use my skills 
transparently, just as effectively. That doesn't mean I disagree with people's right to 
consider that, and to even maybe pursue that[euthanasia]. 
 
    CDD: Do you ever have a sort of uncomfortable feeling that you're in any kind of a grey 
area? 
 
    – I don't – I think there must be grey areas, but certainly, I – I'm comfortable in my intent 
 
    Respondent 8 (male, atheist) 
 
    Narrative 4 
    . . . it was a terrible state. And she said ‘I want to be sedated, this is the only way I can deal 
with what's happening.’ She'd been in here for, I don't know, 6 months, a long while, and we 
sedated her, and we did it in a step-wise thing.[At first]she was hazy, off with the pixies a bit, 
but she liked that . . . and then she got to a point where she said ‘No, I want, you know, I 
want to be out of it completely’, so we just upped it until she was out of it completely, but 
there was a sense that . . . I don't feel I was killing her. I felt I was actually making her 
comfortable. 
 
    CDD: How did you manage fluids and so on, after that? 
 
    I don't think there was . . . any more of that at all. ‘Cause she'd tried to starve herself, 
she'd tried to stop eating . . . stopped drinking, and it didn't work . . . aside from the fact that 
she was terribly sick, she was still a big, well-nourished woman, and it would have taken her 
a long, long while to starve herself to death. 
 
    CDD: And drinking? 
 
    And drinking. Um, she wouldn't stop it all, because most people feel awful. 
 
    CDD: Do you have any feel for how long she would've survived had she not had sedation, if 
she'd gone on drinking? 
 
    Um,[long pause]oh . . . weeks, still, probably . . . I don't think death was absolutely 
imminent . . . but . . . she was going to die from what it was. And she'd really, it'd gone on for 
long enough . . . she'd've died within a couple of weeks, I suppose. 
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    CDD: You said, sometimes in those sort of circumstances, some of the other staff feel 
quite uncomfortable. Why do you think that is? 
 
    There's a fairly . . . small minority of Catholics, who see it as a form of euthanasia, I think. 
And, you can't persuade them otherwise. In the same way as, I don't think I can be 
persuaded that I'm practising euthanasia. And some people just feel it's . . . too close to 
euthanasia . . . they won't make that distinction 
 
    CDD: Why is [that distinction] important? 
 
    [Pause]I don't think I can kill another human being. . . . I feel very strongly that as doctors, 
we shouldn't be killing, ‘cause I think it changes the whole dynamic of the relationship . . . 
and I hope that I couldn't kill another human being 
 
    Respondent 17 (female, practising Anglican) 
 
Analysis 
The main themes of interest all pertain either to the intentional hastening of death or the (‘merely’) 
foreseen hastening of death, and will be considered under 5 headings relating to foresight, 
intention, personal discomfort, professional concerns, and illness trajectory. 
Foresight and Its Uncertainties 
In a dying patient, it may be very difficult to foresee whether the administration of sedation will 
hasten death, or merely coincide with an ‘imminent’ death due to the underlying cause. A number of 
respondents commented on this: 
 
    I think there are a few occasions where patients possibly died from sedation rather than 
from ah[sighs]you know,[they’ve]died from both[the underlying illness and the sedation]. 
 
    Respondent 5 (female, atheist) 
 
    I would suggest that it's probably a photo finish in many instances 
 
    Respondent 3 (male, Roman Catholic) 
 
In Narratives 1 and 3, for example, it is not clear that the administration of sedation did hasten 
death, nor that the respondents foresaw death as a likely result of administering sedation. (In 
Narrative 1, in contrast, the withdrawal of ventilatory support contributed foreseeably to the timing 
of death.) 
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On the other hand, in Narrative 2 the causative link is strongly implied (there being ‘a very close 
association’ between the action and death) and in Narrative 4, it is explicit (the respondent 
indicating that the patient would have survived for weeks if she had continued to eat and drink). In 
both cases, it seems highly likely that a hastened death was foreseen as a likely outcome of the 
sedation provided. 
 
Intention and its ambiguities 
In reflecting on these difficult cases, the palliative care physicians interviewed regard intention as a 
matter of genuine importance, something about which they must be quite clear. In Narratives 3 and 
4, the respondents seem to have achieved that clarity for themselves, although there appears to be 
an underlying ambiguity about intention in Narrative 4 (‘It'd gone on long enough’). In Narratives 1 
and 2, the respondents explicitly acknowledge ambiguities of intention (note the use of words such 
as ‘mental gymnastics’ and ‘muddles’) but seem determined to try to resolve them as far as possible. 
Many respondents made comments to the same effect: 
 
    I think 90% of the time it's pretty straightforward, and 10% of the time, it's mental 
gymnastics. And the mental gymnastics are always the ones that eat you, and you sweat 
over . . .  
 
    Respondent 14 (female, Anglican upbringing, not a strong church-goer) 
 
Only one respondent expressed a predominantly skeptical view about intention in this setting: 
 
    we've been so drilled, by the law, and by the concept of the principle of double effect, it's 
just easier to say ‘Yeah, we don't intend to’ 
 
    encouraging, ah, well, hastening the dying process can be a positive . . . but we can't very 
easily[say]‘we're meaning to hasten this dying process’. . . that goes against the grain of the 
law, and it cuts across people's moral training[but]it is a bit of an escape clause to say ‘My 
intention wasn't to do that’’ 
 
    Respondent 13 (male, Roman Catholic upbringing but now atheistic/agnostic) 
 
Notwithstanding these comments, Respondent 13 was clearly mindful of the law and the need to 
practise in a manner consistent with that of his colleagues: 
 
    I prescribe terminal sedation[but]I think some of my colleagues would probably prescribe 
a lot more than I would . . . being a part of a team, and broader community . . . it does 
moderate what you're prepared to do. 
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Personal discomfort with intentionally hastening death 
 
In all four narratives, respondents give implied or explicit expressions of discomfort with the idea of 
intentionally hastening death. This discomfort seems to lend credence to respondents’ descriptions 
of their own intentions. In this respect the narratives are representative of the entire study cohort. 
Discomfort with the prospect of performing euthanasia is of particular interest amongst those who 
do not have a religious or ideological opposition: 
 
    I just personally could never, ever, ever live with that 
 
    Respondent 5 (Female, no religious beliefs) 
 
    I think I would have a large degree of discomfort, from a personal perspective 
 
    Respondent 9 (Male, ‘very anti-organizational religion’) 
 
    morally . . . I don't have a problem with euthanasia . . . But at the same time, I don't 
actually think that I would be able, or want, to actually euthanase someone 
 
    Respondent 14 (Female, brought up Anglican, not a strong church-goer) 
 
    I used to be quite for euthanasia, I think as I've done more palliative care I've become a bit 
more on the fence about it, and I don't think I would want to be the one to have to perform 
that service 
 
    Respondent 18 (female, atheist) 
 
Professional concerns about intentionally hastening death 
 
Narratives 1 and 3 illustrate the significance of the intention-foresight distinction to respondents 
who have no religious or ideological opposition to euthanasia. There were many other examples: 
 
    there may be situations where it's a blurry line[with regard to knowledge about whether 
death has been hastened]but . . . if there was an intention then that would be crossing the 
line, basically. 
 
    Respondent 10 (male, atheist) 
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    I have absolutely no doubt that[her death]was as a result of the sedation. But . . . I still 
wouldn't see it as euthanasia, because it wasn't intentional, I didn't intend to do that. 
 
    Respondent 18 (female, atheist) 
 
Many respondents referred specifically to their professional role when stating that they did not want 
to intentionally hasten death: 
 
    I'd feel uncomfortable with doing it as a professional. Um, would I do it to somebody I 
loved, if I thought that was the right thing to do? Dunno 
 
    Respondent 9 (Male, Very anti-organizational religion) 
 
There were three overlapping ‘sub-themes’ relating to professional roles. First, many respondents 
noted that distress (including that of the family) is sometimes transferred to the treating team (as 
illustrated in Narrative 2). There were concerns that euthanasia could inappropriately become a 
response to the doctor's or the family's distress, undermining the doctor's professional duty to his or 
her patient: 
 
    If I was to start being influenced by the emotions of the situation around, about the timing 
of death, then . . . you lose clear parameters of what you're trying to do 
 
    Respondent 1 (Male, ‘I've got a Catholic faith’) 
 
    I've seen with doctors in the acute system . . . that[they]perhaps do have an intent to 
hasten death[and]my feeling is that they do it because they feel uncomfortable . . . if 
families are struggling with the situation, it's certainly not uncommon to get either a direct 
request, or implied requests, to do something to hasten death and I think perhaps[palliative 
care specialists]are better at addressing that, as a specific part of what we do, rather than 
sharing that distress, and wanting it ‘all over’. . . you know, as the doctor as well. 
 
    Respondent 10 (Male, ‘organized religion doesn't do a lot for me’) 
 
Second, there were concerns about doctor-patient communication. The availability of euthanasia 
could undermine the doctor's role in listening – and in trying to discover the cause of the patient's 
distress in this setting: 
 
    . . . it depends . . . what it is you hear them saying, that they want to be dead . . . or . . . ‘I 
just don't want to go through this’ . . . Teasing that sort of stuff out is part of what we do. 
 
    Respondent 17 (Female, practising Anglican) 
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    [We]need to see that the way of dealing with a complaint is not to dispatch the 
complainer 
 
    Respondent 11 (male, practising Anglican) 
 
Communication could also be impoverished if fear of the possibility of euthanasia led patients to 
hide their distress: 
 
    My view of euthanasia's quite open.[But]from a professional point of view, no, I want my 
patients to be able to put their views out there, and be able to discuss . . . in an open and 
supportive manner. 
 
    Respondent 9 (Male, ‘very anti-organizational religion’) 
 
Third, some respondents perceived that euthanasia could become a kind of surrender response 
when curative measures have failed. This could potentially undermine many positive aspects of 
palliative medicine that separate it professionally from curative medicine: 
 
    I'm giving[what]I originally said I'd do medicine for: maximal care . . . We don't 
abandon[patients], we do the reverse . . .  
 
    Respondent 7 (male, ‘more humanistic than spiritual’) 
 
    it's really important that we're not seen as the grim reapers that just usher everyone off . . 
. that's not the profession that I want to be in. And we don't want people to be thinking that 
that's what we're doing, or they won't make the referrals for the patients who need them. 
 
    Respondent 16 (female, Jewish ‘but I certainly don't get to the synagogue very often these days’) 
 
    palliative care has emerged out of a review of what our responsibilities are as doctors . . . 
really, on our watch, that family, social experience of dying has been kind of 
overwhelmed[and]palliative care[is]in some ways regaining lost ground . . . I tend to regard 
it in those terms as, as a very positive advancement and really I don't think that euthanasia 
contributes to that advancement. 
 
    Respondent 3 (male, ‘Roman Catholic . . . underpinning of my spiritual beliefs’) 
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Illness trajectory and willingness to sedate to unconsciousness 
In Narrative 3, the respondent notes that a decision to sedate heavily (to unconsciousness) is 
influenced by ‘where that person is in their illness trajectory’.22 Almost all respondents concurred. 
There was a strong sense from some respondents that ‘early terminal sedation’ felt too ‘close’ to 
assisted suicide because of the personal sense of ‘collaboration’:23 
 
    [It would make me]an accomplice almost in her death and in her decision to end her life sooner 
 
    Respondent 2 (male, Christian) 
 
    what I would be primarily ah, affronted by is the fact that I'd contributed to . . . some sort 
of theft of life 
 
    Respondent 3 (male, ‘Roman Catholic . . . underpinning of my spiritual beliefs’) 
 
From a patient-centred perspective, ‘early terminal sedation’ raised some of the same concerns that 
arise around a request for euthanasia: 
 
    I'm not as uncomfortable[as some]around that notion[of sedating patients with existential 
distress]but I think you still need to go down the track of trying to unpack things, and 
understand[from]where that distress is coming 
 
    Respondent 20 (male, ‘atheist’) 
 
    I don't like the idea that there may be opportunities lost . . . contact, intimacy, sort of 
shared experiences lost . . .  
 
    Respondent 3 (male, ‘Roman Catholic . . . underpinning of my spiritual beliefs’) 
 
In contrast, the possibility of the patient enjoying further meaningful experience is more likely to 
have passed when the later stages of illness are reached: 
 
    . . . where it's clearly a more terminal delirium there are no prizes for lightening off the 
sedation . . . you're certainly not going to be able to get them back to any sort of meaningful 
communication 
 
    Respondent 8 (male, atheist) 
 
And at a late stage of illness, the sense of personal responsibility seems to be diminished: 
15 |  P a g e
 
 
    where it seems to me we are on the final stage of the final downhill run . . . I'd have the 
perception that most of the things I do are probably not making much difference one way or 
the other[to the timing of death] 
 
    Respondent 2 (male, Christian) 
 
DISCUSSION 
Methodological issues and limitations 
The small numbers of participants in this study together with non-random recruitment raises 
questions about whether the findings are ‘representative’ of a wider population (a common concern 
with regard to qualitative research). The most obvious potential concern was that the study might 
attract individuals with extreme religious or ideological views, particularly ideological commitments 
to or against euthanasia, but there was no evidence of such imbalance. In any case, the purpose of 
this study was not to make claims about how many doctors think a certain way, but to illustrate the 
variety of problems doctors face in their decision-making. The narratives above show doctors of 
different ages, genders, religious backgrounds and ideologies facing similar problems. 
 
Also inherent in qualitative research is the possibility that the interviewer and authors subjectively 
influence the findings by the questions asked, and the passages selected for presentation. We have 
tried to limit this bias by independent coding by each author, and by presenting minimally edited 
narratives that ‘speak for themselves’, together with the interviewer's questions where relevant, so 
that readers can judge for themselves whether the respondent has been ‘led’. 
 
The intention–foresight distinction 
The main purpose of this study was to examine the distinction between intention and foresight in 
the practice of palliative care through a qualitative analysis of the use of sedation at the end of life. 
We cannot claim to know whether our respondents did or did not intend to hasten the deaths of 
their patients in the cases described, most obviously because we cannot assume that there is a 
direct relationship between ‘what happened’ and how informants report in retrospect what 
happened,24 and this includes, perhaps particularly, accounts of informants’ states of mind. What 
seems clear from this study, however, is that the intention-foresight distinction does matter to those 
who routinely care for dying patients. The distinction matters from both professional and personal 
points of view, as it allows palliative care specialists to be seen, and to see themselves, as doing one 
thing (providing care), and not another (hastening death). For many of the respondents, the 
distinction is important even though they are not morally opposed to euthanasia: 
 
    I haven't got any strong moral or religious objection to euthanasia, but it's not what I do 
 
    Respondent 8 (male, atheist) 
 
There was evidence of significant ambiguity around intention in some of the narratives.25 However, 
the picture we observed in this study of palliative care physicians was quite different from that 
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observed in our earlier study of general physicians,26 and we think the differences are likely to 
reflect the different populations. General physicians in the first study seemed to tolerate or even 
encourage a sense of ambiguity of intention around analgesic or sedative use. In contrast (with the 
exception of respondent 13), palliative care physicians interviewed in this study seemed determined 
to be as clear as possible about intention, often conducting a very careful self-examination to try to 
ensure that they had not crossed a line. Respondents were thus quite self-conscious about intention. 
Indeed it could be said that most of the respondents in this study were ‘intending not to intend’ any 
hastening of the patient's death. In the context of our last study, we suggested that this was 
‘psychologically dubious’ but this study suggests that such self-consciousness can be a good thing. In 
almost every case it was apparent that respondents had made or were making efforts to check for 
ambiguities of intention, rather than simply saying to themselves that ‘I'm kidding myself, and that's 
OK’. The doctors we interviewed appeared to have cultivated their behaviour along clear 
‘intentional’ lines in much the way that Bratman seems to have imagined when he described a ‘self-
governing intention’, making ‘a commitment to refrain from the patterns of thinking and acting that 
would be involved in an intentional killing.’27 They appear to have made this commitment because 
they perceive it to be important, not only for personal comfort, but to preserve a professional role 
that allows them to best serve their patients. 
 
Of course, these interviews do show that intention is complex; thus, while a ‘self-governing 
intention’ to refrain from killing might be the sine qua non of good palliative care for many 
specialists, there may remain a risk of self-deception or oversimplification if it is too blithely 
accepted. One of the respondents seemed to imply just this: 
 
    . . . but . . . I think if you don't sometimes do the mental gymnastics, maybe it's ‘cause 
you've fallen into such a kind of, ‘Yeah, yeah, what I do is always right’, and you're not, to my 
mind, you're not even asking yourself the question. 
 
    Respondent 14 (female, Anglican upbringing, not a strong church-goer) 
 
Intention, foresight, and the Principle of Double Effect 
The intention–foresight distinction is central to (but not synonymous with) the ‘Principle of Double 
Effect’ (PDE). The PDE asserts that one might be permitted to cause ‘harm’ or do ‘evil’, as a side 
effect of one's action, if the harm or evil is foreseen but unintended (and is not disproportionate to 
the good one intends).28 This study supports the idea that the intention–foresight distinction is 
morally important in end-of-life care. However, we have three concerns about incorporating that 
distinction into a broader ‘moral principle’ that is alleged to be the basis of clinical practice in this 
area, and that is taught to young doctors and medical students. 
 
First, the narratives in this study illustrate how the PDE fails to support an absolute prohibition on 
killing, in so far as it fails to draw a clear line between permissible and impermissible deaths.29 In 
hard cases, as has been argued in the philosophy literature,30 there is no simple resolution of 
ambiguities of intention so that acts are obviously ‘Right’ or ‘Wrong’. In Narrative 1, while the 
palliative care specialist went through his ‘mental gymnastics’, the GP would have ‘nothing to do 
with it’. Most of his medical students consider his actions to be the equivalent of euthanasia. In 
Narrative 4, while the agent was comfortable with her own intentions, other staff at the hospital 
were uncomfortable and felt her actions were ‘too close to euthanasia’. 
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Second, the claim that the PDE applies in a palliative care setting is likely to be met with some 
cynicism, because the assertion implausibly suggests that the death of the terminally ill patient 
counts as a ‘harm’ or even an ‘evil’. The words and actions of those involved usually suggest 
otherwise. Doctors, nurses and families are often hoping for death to come soon; and efforts to 
prolong life are withheld: 
 
    double effect worries about a bad effect versus a good effect [but] I don't see death as a 
bad effect. 
 
    Respondent 8 (male, atheist) 
 
Third, even as a general guide to the ‘palliatively naïve’, the PDE may be a two-edged sword. On the 
one hand it may be a way of ensuring that doctors are sufficiently generous in the analgesia or 
sedation they provide: 
 
    it does [help doctors] who may be a little bit less clear about what they're doing . . . where 
otherwise they might've been thinking ‘I can't increase the dose anymore because I might 
kill them’. 
 
    Respondent 8 (male, atheist) 
 
On the other hand, promotion of the PDE may encourage precisely the sort of cultivated ambiguities 
that we reported in our previous study of general physicians, and this in turn may lead not to ‘evil’, 
but to very unsophisticated and uncritical end-of-life care: 
 
    I am appalled by the teaching of the double effect to the med students . . . it's an 
outmoded concept and a completely unnecessary concept. 
 
    I know a lot of our colleagues practise it. Outside palliative care. I'm aware that it is 
standard practice in some physicians just to increase doses of morphine knowing full well 
that the likely outcome may be death. 
 
    Respondent 5 (female, atheist) 
 
Of course, this latter problem potentially exists whether one talks of the ‘Principle of Double Effect’ 
or of a morally important intention–foresight distinction. It may be difficult to promote the 
importance of the distinction without encouraging its abuses in some quarters. It is likely also that 
there will remain many skeptics, particularly as a result of the ‘mental gymnastics’ that seem to be 
involved in hard cases. 
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Sedation and withdrawal or withholding of treatment 
We have tried to limit the focus of this paper to the intention-foresight distinction. As a final 
comment, however, we must acknowledge the potential philosophical ‘work’ being done in palliative 
care by another contentious distinction, that between killing and letting die.31 The legitimacy of ‘not 
trying to prolong life’ seems to be taken for granted in Narratives 1 and 4 and indeed seemed to be 
assumed by all respondents. Clearly, withholding medical hydration (as in Narrative 4) or 
withdrawing ventilatory support (as in Narrative 1) can have significant and sometimes obvious 
effects on the timing of death. When this is combined with sedation, it may contribute to the feeling 
that a death is ‘too close’ to being a case of euthanasia, either in terms of causation or in terms of 
intention or both.32 A further exploration of doctors’ views on the distinction between killing and 
withholding and withdrawing potentially life-sustaining treatment is likely to be an important matter 
for future qualitative research. 
 
SUMMARY 
This study provides empirical evidence that the intention–foresight distinction is important to 
Australian palliative care specialists. The significance of the distinction seems to be a matter of 
‘moral psychology’ relating to personal experience and the preservation of professional roles, rather 
than a simple ideological commitment. ‘Intention’ may be very complex, and the intention-foresight 
distinction may be too difficult to draw, in exceptional cases, to distinguish euthanasia from 
palliative care to the satisfaction of all; but that does not in itself undermine the importance of the 
distinction for ‘run of the mill’ cases. Future work in this field should perhaps move on from the 
question of whether the ‘Principle of Double Effect’ ‘is’ or ‘is not’ a valid (‘absolute’) moral principle 
to further consideration of whether and why it might be important or appropriate for doctors to 
cultivate certain patterns of behaviour. 
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